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THE LAW AS A PATH TO THE WORLD 
Francis A. Allen*t 
Many years ago the late Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
observed: "The law is a small subject (though ... it leads to all 
things) .... "1 The comments that follow are an elaboration of 
Justice Holmes's theme. It will be asserted that one characteristic 
of legal studies, properly pursued, is that they lead to a fuller 
understanding of the larger world of which the law and its institu-
tions are a part. Because the law leads to a larger world of per-
sons, events, and ideas, it claims the attention even of those 
possessing no interest in acquiring professional legal skills. This 
characteristic of legal studies, it will be argued, provides one (but 
by no means the only) important justification for the humanistic 
pursuit of the law. 
Clearly, the assertion that the law may be seen as an avenue 
to deeper cultural understanding requires demonstration; and 
one might assume that such a demonstration, if it is possible at 
all, will perhaps be made most readily in the field of criminal law. 
This assumption is based on the facts that the criminal law re-
sponds to the most basic requirements for social living-reason-
able security of life, limb, and possessions from unwarranted 
aggressions; that the criminal law possesses the most drastic 
sanctions at the disposal of government-the deprivation of the 
convicted offender's property, his liberty, and, on occasion, his 
very life; and that the criminal law must inevitably express views 
about the nature of human beings and their behavior. 
The relevance of the criminal law to the purposes at hand is 
corroborated by a glance at recent history. To a remarkable de-
gree our basic societal concerns and the issues that divide us have 
appeared in sharpest focus in the criminal law and its applica-
tions. In 1932 the Supreme Court of the United States almost for 
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the first time tested the adequacy of state criminal procedures 
against the great moral imperatives of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and in doing so began a new chapter in our constitutional 
history. It is, of course, a coincidence that the decision of Powell 
v. Alabama was made within only a few months of the rise of 
Hitler in Germany.2 Yet both occurrences may b(il located in the 
same current of events. A crisis in freedom has afflicted western 
societies since the First World War; and the conclusion has grown 
that the proper regulation of governmental authority within the 
system of criminal justice is an indispensable part of the strategy 
of freedom. Since the Second World War, basic issues have as-
sumed even more concrete forms in the criminal law. Fundamen-
tal questions about the nature of political obligation and the 
emancipation of conscience from legal restraints emerged in the 
1960s. These questions were made inescapable by the criminal 
prosecutions of some who opposed the Vietnam War or who ad-
vanced the cause of racial militancy. Closely related were the 
allegations of inequality and inequity in American society. These 
charges, of course, were not confined to the system of criminal 
justice. But assertions of inequality possess a sharper bite when 
levelled against a system concerned, as is criminal justice, with 
issues of freedom and restraint, of life and death. Finally, the 
administration of criminal justice has held a central position in 
our political dialogue because of a widespread conviction of in-
creasing crime in this country. Fears of a collapse of public order 
are, and have long been, a powerful dynamic in American poli-
tics. They profoundly affected, perhaps determined, the outcome 
of at least one recent presidential election. 
The involvements of the criminal law with the culture of 
which it is a part, however, are not limited to the great political 
struggles of the times. Perhaps more interesting and significant 
is the illumination it sheds on certain underlying intellectual is-
sues, issues that pervade our literature, art, and politics-issues, 
it may be added, that define the limits, color, and feel of the 
modern world. 
Some months ago I received a letter from a behavioral scien-
tist at another university who, in effect, said: "No one who knows 
anything can possibly take seriously what the criminal law as-
sumes about human behavior." A student who has spent any 
considerable time with the substantive criminal law-that body 
2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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of law which seeks to elucidate· the bases of criminal liability and 
punishment-will have no difficulty in grasping my correspon-
dent's meaning. The very vocabulary of the criminal law is an 
affront to many modern men and women. The law speaks of 
human purpose and responsibility, of guilty minds and guilty 
acts, justification and excuse. Surely such language asserts, or 
appears to assert, views about the nature of human beings and 
the bases of human behavior. Clearly, too, the views apparently 
asserted conflict with the post~lates underlying much modern 
thought, including much that is cultivated in the university. 
My correspondent thus identified a crucial issue: Who are 
the blameworthy and the praiseworthy in modern society? or, 
stated perhaps more accurately, Do the concepts of praisewor-
thiness and blameworthiness possess meaning and utility in the 
modern era? Although correct in perceiving the significance of the 
issue, my correspondent failed to make two further observations. 
The first is that despite its vocabulary, criminal justice, when 
viewed in its entirety, neglects to take a clear and unambiguous 
stance toward these issues. It hedges its bets. It speaks, now of 
moral autonomy, now from deterministic assumptions: It as-
sumes the mantle of the moral philosopher and, a moment later, 
the posture of the behaviorist. It reveals ambivalence and self-
contradiction. The second observation is that in so conducting 
itself the criminal law proceeds in a fashion wholly typical of the 
wider society. The same revulsions and ambivalences character-
ize our literature and politics. At least since Ivan Karamazov 
uttered his impassioned protests against the modern age, a legion 
of humanists has set itself against an emerging scientific view of 
human nature. Yet the lines are not firm. In the 1970s Doris 
Lessing identified "a confusion of standards and . . . uncertainty 
of values" as the distinguishing characteristic of our literature. 
"It is hard to make moral judgements [sic]," she wrote, "to use 
words like good or bad. "3 Confusion about the bases of human 
action pervade our educational practice and social behavior. Per-
haps as good a definition of modern man as any other is that he 
is one divided within himself about his own nature. 
These observations lead to the principle of blameworthiness 
in the criminal law and to the suspicion that its career possesses 
a significance radiating beyond the law. Those espousing the 
principle of blameworthiness assert that the definition of criminal 
3. D. LESSING, A SMALL PERsONAL VOICE 5 (1974). 
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behavior must contain the element of moral default on the part 
of offenders. This principle is susceptible of widely varying mean-
ings. The extreme retributivist position, sometimes associated 
with the name oflmmanuel Kant, holds that the purpose of crim-
inal punishment is to vindicate the moral law, a purpose in which 
considerations of immediate social utility and advantage play no 
determining role. Whatever the intellectual interest in this asser-
tion, it has offered small attractions to law-givers. No western 
society-neither sixteenth-century Geneva nor seventeenth-
century New England-has attempted to give it consistent pract-
ical application. 
There are more modest versions of the blameworthiness prin-
ciple, however. Thus, it may be said that persons must not be 
criminally punished unless they are morally culpable. This view 
of the matter does not deny utilitarian ends for criminal punish-
ment. One holding it may even concede that although proof of 
moral default is relevant to the justice of punishment, it does not 
explain why there should be criminal punishment. Justification 
of resort to punishment can be said to rest on utilitarian calcula-
tion-the deterrence or incapacitation of offenders, their rehabili-
tation, the security and survival of the state. What is insisted on 
is that whenever social goals are pursued by the state, it may 
properly employ criminal penalties only when the accused reveals 
moral culpability. There thus emerges from the blameworthiness 
principle the proposition that criminal behavior cannot be de-
fined simply as that which is dangerous to social interests. Dan-
gerous behavior may be unintended or nonnegligent. Criminality 
properly defined must also encompass behavior that can fairly be 
seen as a _product of moral default, a conscious flouting of moral 
norms. 
As might be expected, this and related conceptions of crimi-
nal behavior have been under heavy attack in the modern world. 
Yet there has probably never been a time when the moral blame-
worthiness of offenders was wholly excluded from serious thought 
about the penal law. Moreover, we are now living through ape-
riod in which the principle of blameworthiness is being strongly 
reasserted, a support expressed by individuals and groups repre-
senting widely divergent personal and social philosophies. What, 
then, are the sources of this historical support for the blamewor-
thiness principle and, especially, what are the sources of its mod-
ern advocacy? Full and satisfactory answers to these complex 
questions can hardly be undertaken here, but a few observations 
will be offered. 
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Perhaps the most basic reason for the persistence and sur-
vival of the blameworthiness principle is that in many instances 
it expresses what might be called the popular understanding of 
criminality. In widely differing societies rulers have encountered 
stubborn communal insistence that only those persons who de-
serve such treatment should be subjected to the severe and 
stigmatic penalties of the criminal law. Deserved punishment, in 
tum, appears to imply an offender possessed of meaningful pow-
ers to choose his own acts and one who has used those powers to 
pursue a course offensive to decency and propriety. That moral 
conviction and outrage fuel the system of criminal justice requires 
little demonstration. Patently such motivations significantly in-
fluence what kinds of behavior will be defined as criminal; what 
acts will be selected for criminal prosecution; and what penalties 
will be imposed once offenders are convicted. A law-giver who has 
misjudged the community's sense of propriety and proportion by 
condemning acts that are widely approved or authorizing penal-
ties too extreme, may encounter the phenomenon of nullification: 
Prosecutors may refuse to prosecute; juries may disregard the 
evidence and acquit, and judges may in myriad ways frustrate the 
enforcement of the law. The Prohibition Experiment provided 
many instances of such responses, but examples may be drawn 
from other historical periods, including the present. 
The community's sense of propriety and proportion, which 
often gives support to the blameworthiness principle in criminal 
justice, performs broader functions within the legal system. The 
point may be located by asking, Why do political regimes capable 
of exercising naked power consent to be bound by bodies of legal 
principle? One answer, of course, is that such regimes sometimes 
do not consent, and that history is replete with instances of 
"direct action" by tyrannical governments in disregard of law. 
Yet the reality of law in many aspects of life in totalitarian socie-
ties is evident and requires explanation. Part of the answer must 
lie in the fact that, although the law limits the volition of such 
regimes, it offers advantages to the rulers as well as the ruled. The 
exercise of naked power may often impose unacceptable costs on 
the regime. Even Hitler on occasion found this to be true. More 
importantly, however, governmental power is simply incapable of 
dealing with the multitude of issues emerging from a complex 
society without some kind of standardization of response. Just as 
theologians in the eighteenth century found more comprehensible 
a God who rules through natural law than one who exercises an 
infinity of discrete volitional acts, so also political regimes, even 
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those apparently possessed of unlimited powers, have found the 
law to be indispensable; for it affords essential economies of effort 
and resources. To achieve these economies, however, the law 
must consistently inspire high levels of voluntary compliance on 
the part of those subject to its authority. This, in turn, presup-
poses a body of legal principle that can be readily understood and 
acted on. Perhaps especially in the areas of penal law, an effective 
body of legal principle is one that is generally comprehensible to 
the affected citizens, not only in the sense of being capable of 
rational application by them, but which also appeals to almost 
instinctual feelings of fitness and propriety. It may go beyond 
demonstration to assert that no system of penal law that totally 
excludes the concept of blameworthiness can satisfy these condi-
tions in our culture. But the strong propensities to associate crim-
inality with moral default suggest, if they do not actually prove, 
that attempts to eliminate the factor of blameworthiness from the 
criminal law threaten its coherence and effectiveness. 
Other and quite different defenses of the blameworthiness 
principle, however, are being advanced today. Many of these re-
flect the sensitivity widely felt in the modern world for political 
issues involving the relations of the individual to the state. Al-
though lately we have been invited by Professor B.F. Skinner to 
proceed beyond human freedom and dignity, those values still 
retain a certain following in the late twentieth century. Some 
proponents of freedom and dignity believe the penal law's concep-
tion of human nature to be of critical importance, for it is seen 
as influencing the placement of the line separating the realm of 
the individual from that of the state. Thus, it is argued, no theo-
retical limits on state intervention into the lives and psyches of 
individuals emerge-except those resulting from technical inca-
pacity-when the human animal is viewed simply as a product 
derived from the vectoring of his genetic endowments and his life 
experiences. In support of this proposition attention is called to 
the perhaps curious fact that a penal system strongly dedicated 
to the rehabilitation and character-changing of offenders often 
produces measures more stringent than those predicated on the 
notion of deserved punishment. Thus, a conception of the human 
being as an entity possessing moral autonomy, as one eligible for 
praise or blame, is seen as important not only to ethical but also 
to basic political concerns. · 
Much more might be said, of course, about the modern de-
fenses of the blameworthiness principle in the criminal law. Yet 
an impatient reaction may be anticipated. If so much can be said 
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for the principle of blameworthiness, even when delineated in the 
broad strokes employed here, is it not clear what course the law 
should take? Why (it may be asked) do not lawyers, judges, legis-
lators, and others concerned with such things, proceed to the 
formulation of a penal code that gives clear and consistent expres-
sion to the blameworthiness principle? Why not a morally based 
criminal law? It is in attempting to respond to these and similar 
questions that one uncovers the clearest evidences of the kinship 
of the criminal law with the times in which it functions. For in 
the effort to predicate criminal liability on moral culpability and 
to proportion penalties to moral default one instantly becomes 
enmeshed in a gamut of characteristic modern issues. Here one 
tastes the flavor of the twentieth century and learns of ambiguity, 
contradiction, conflict of social purpose, compromise, and inco-
herence. When he was a candidate for the presidency, Mr. Carter 
called for a morally based politics and a morally based foreign 
policy. One suspects that the success of efforts to achieve a mor-
ally based criminal law will prove as tentative and incomplete as 
that in other areas, and for many of the same reasons. 
The first of the obstacles to the implementation of the 
blameworthiness principle has already been adverted to: the 
modern doubts about the reality and extent of moral freedom. 
Wherever one may ultimately strike the balance between fate and 
freedom when considering human behavior, no one who has been 
exposed to modern currents of thought is likely thereafter to feel 
entirely at ease with the concepts of responsibility and culpability 
as those ideas are employed in the criminal law. This unease may 
be enhanced by the suspicion that on occasion the concept of 
responsibility has been utilized for repressive social purposes. 
-These doubts have affected the nature of criminal law scholarship 
in this country. Some serious students have found themselves in 
positions like those of liberal clergymen whose faith in the as-
sumptions of the traditional theology are shaken but who are 
unwilling to separate themselves completely from the tradition 
they have come to doubt. This may provide the most fundamen-
tal explanation for the fact that, at least until recently, American 
criminal law scholarship has often ignored questions of principle 
and definition and has, instead, focussed on problems of process 
and procedure and on the techniques of penological treatment. 
Yet these doubts, important as they are, are not the origin 
of all limitations on the expression of the blameworthiness princi-
ple in the criminal law. Obstacles to its full realization spring 
from a wide variety of other sources. Some of these inhere in the 
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structure of criminal justice itself. Moral evaluation requires that 
attention be focussed on the internal mental states of accused 
persons, and places heavy burdens on the processes of proof. As 
a common-law judge remarked five centuries ago: "[T]he Devil 
[himself] knoweth not the thoughts of man."4 One may antici-
pate only rough-and-ready, relatively unsophisticated, moral 
evaluations from an operating system of criminal justice. There 
are other technical obstacles. If the definition of murder, for ex-
ample, includes the element of "killing another human being," 
it is clear that A who, intending to kill B, shoots and misses, is 
not guilty of murder and not eligible for its attendant penalties. 
This is true even though A possesses the moral culpability of a 
murderer and may pose as serious a threat of future danger as one 
who has killed. Some such moral anomalies can be eliminated or 
minimized, but it is doubtful that all can be removed. 
Another cluster of restraints results from the facts that the 
law is multi-valued and multi-purposed and that these various 
purposes compete for realization. In the criminal law the insistent 
nature of its regulatory purposes may often induce many to reject 
concern for the fine shadings of moral culpability, as a luxury too 
expensive to indulge. In the areas of economic crime the impulse 
to achieve regulatory objectives has resulted in a body of law that 
renders issues of moral culpability largely irrelevant and strips 
from the system those principles relied on elsewhere to contain 
the powers of government exerted in the criminal process. The 
most dramatic manifestation of this tendency is the doctrine of 
strict liability. Literally thousands of statutes have been enacted 
imposing often substantial criminal penalties on persons who for-
tuitously produce a forbidden result, persons who did not intend 
the result and who may have exerted every reasonable means to 
avoid it. Nor is this tendency confined to cases of economic crime; 
it is often manifest in areas of violent behavior. Thus, frequently, 
persons who have committed acts of violence but in circum-
stances of great pressure are denied the mitigation that an analy-
sis of their culpability might require. When this occurs, it ordi-
narily reflects deterrent concerns-the belief that concessions to 
the prisoner at the bar will (to use the language of the behaviorist) 
"reinforce" tendencies to violence in other persons. 
I shall refer to only one more of the many other factors condi-
tioning the contributions of the blameworthiness principle to the 
4. Y. B. Pasch. 17 Edw. 4, f. 2a, pl. 2 (1477) (Brian, C.J.). 
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criminal law. If one asserts that crime, properly defined, must 
include elements of behavior fairly characterized as the products 
of moral default, he must expect in this pluralistic age to encoun-
ter the questions, "What morality?" and "Whose morality?" Nor 
can these challenges always be set to rest through the processes 
of democratic lawmaking-by judicial edict or legislative enact-
ment-as the continuing abortion controversy abundantly illus-
trates. The law relating to justification of the use of deadly force 
provides other instances of the conflict of moralities. Here one 
encounters a confrontation between the written law's effort to 
restrict the uses of deadly force to narrow limits, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, what might be called a popular ethic of private 
violence. The prototypical case is one in which a householder has 
killed a burglar or a chicken thief, but under circumstances in 
which the crime-preventive purpose might reasonably have been 
achieved without taking life. Although it is relatively clear in 
such cases that the householder has himself committed a serious 
offense, the processes of nullification often defeat the criminal 
prosecution of such defendants. The ethic of private violence 
manifests itself in other contexts-in the arguments and tacctics 
of gun-control opponents and in the defenses sometimes offered 
for political violence and terrorism. Perhaps fortunately, this so-
ciety provides no philosopher-kings to resolve such value con-
flicts; but the persistence of these issues constricts the possibili-
ties of a morally based criminal law. 
Enough has now been said to demonstrate the tenuous na-
ture of the hold maintained by the blameworthiness principle on 
the criminal law. Perhaps these comments also reveal some im-
portant characteristics of the intellectual problems encountered 
in the penal law. It would surely be erroneous to conclude that 
all is waste and confusion in these legal areas. Yet it is difficult 
to deny that the impression gained from their scrutiny is more 
likely to be that of dissonance and cacophony than of Mozartean 
structure. 
Although the hold of the blameworthiness principle on crimi-
nal justice is tenuous, it has been maintained. Indeed, in recent 
years its grip has been strengthened. Talk about deserved punish-
ment and criminal responsibility seems more confident and less 
qualified today than a decade, certainly two decades, ago. This 
phenomenon gives rise to a new range of problems involving the 
relations of the substantive law, that body of doctrine concerned 
with defining the elements of criminal liability, and the theories 
of penal treatment. A tension has existed between the legal theo-
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ries of liability and those of penological treatment throughout 
most of the twentieth century, but the tension was muted or 
disguised for much of this period because of the ascendancy of 
what I have called the rehabilitative ideal. In the 1970s the ten-
sion became obvious and inescapable. The same public that is 
asked to support the criminal law and to condemn the criminal 
offense is also asked to embrace and provide finan_cial resources 
for programs of correctional treatment that view offenders as the 
products of conditions over which they had little or no control. 
Indeed, the rehabilitative program may insistently eschew the 
labelling of the subject with mQral guilt on the assumption that 
such labelling produces insuperable obstacles to rehabilitation 
and may itself become the source of new crimes and delinquencies 
on the part of criminal offenders. The question arises whether the 
community can simultaneously entertain two views apparently 
based on such sharply divergent postulates or whether they can 
be accommodated with the degree of conviction necessary both 
to vitalize the criminal law as an effective body of regulative 
norms and also to advance programs of treatment realistically 
calculated to render its subjects less likely to off end the legal 
norms. Are we doomed to a condition in which the community is 
perpetually divided between the punitive and the compassionate, 
to a policy reflecting an uneasy compromise of incompatible 
views which succeeds chiefly in cancelling out the effectiveness 
of both tendencies? 
In the 1970s the dominant currents of opinion seek to mini-
mize the tension between the theories of criminal liability and 
penological treatment by largely forsaking the objective of reha-
bilitation in correctional practice. This is a remarkable phenome-
non and one which has much to say about the society in which 
the system of criminal justice functions. 
The rehabilitative ideal encompasses a complex of ideas. For 
present purposes it can be described as the notion that the pri-
mary, perhaps exclusive, objective of penal treatment is to effect 
changes in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted 
offenders, so as to advance the social defense but also to contrib-
ute to the welfare and satisfactions of offenders. The rehabilita-
tive ideal has deep roots in western society. Clearly articulated 
versions of it may be found in the Old Testament and in the 
Greek plays and, again, in the writings of medieval churchmen 
and in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. 
To appreciate the modern decline of the rehabilitative ideal 
one must understand its dominance for the larger part of the 
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twentieth century. However frequently it failed in practical appli-
cation, it nevertheless pervaded theoretical thought, and even in 
the wider community established the aspirations and goals for 
penal treatment. Most of the characteristic innovations in crimi-
nal justice were products of the rehabilitative ideal: the juvenile 
court, systems of parole and probation, therapeutic efforts (how-
ever limited) in the prisons. In the course of a decade, perhaps 
less, the situation has profoundly altered. A spate of legislation 
has been enacted attacking parole and the indeterminate sen-
tence, imposing the assumptions of adult criminality on the juve-
nile court, and explicitly withdrawing rehabilitative objectives 
from sentencing guidelines. Even more remarkable has been the 
disaffection suffered by the rehabilitative ideal in the universities 
where, in the past, it had gained its chief intellectual and emo-
tional support. The rehabilitative ideal, of course, is not dead; 
but, surely, it no longer flourishes. 
The reasons for this precipitous decline may have signifi-
cance beyond the administration of criminal justice. It may be 
assumed that a flourishing rehabilitative ideal presupposes a so-
ciety in which there is vigorous and widespread confidence in the 
malleability of human nature and in the capacity of social insti-
tutions to bring about desirable changes in human attitudes and 
aspirations. It must also be a society with a sufficient consensus 
of values to make possible a workable agreement on what it 
means to be rehabilitated, on the distinction between the malady 
and the cure. Such conditions, at any rate, were satisfied in 
nineteenth-century antebellum America when the rehabilitative 
ideal achieved its first modern flowering. They are not satisfied 
in the America of the 1970s. We are undergoing what Daniel Bell 
has called a crisis of belief, and this crisis provides unfertile 
ground for the rehabilitative ideal. 
It is not only criminal justice that has suffered loss of confid-
ence in American society. All of the institutions traditionally re-
lied on to develop character and social capacities have similarly 
lost support. This seems clearly true of the family, the schools, 
and religion. If the modern literature on the subject is correct or 
even substantially accurate, the family has sustained serious 
losses of authority in its child-rearing functions to the state, the 
schools, peer groups, experts, and to the market. The modern 
conception of the family, we are told, is changing (or has 
changed) from a hierarchical structure characterized by a system 
of mandated mutual obligations to an association of convenience 
designed to advance the satisfactions and sense of self-fulfillment 
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of its individual members. Such changes must surely attenuate 
the effectiveness of the family as a socializing agency, as one 
centrally concerned with character and attitudes. The point need 
not be labored. Similar appraisals of the schools and organized 
religion are likely to reveal substantial diminishments of confi-
dence, not so much in the malleability of human nature, but in 
the capacity of those institutions to produce desirable and effec-
tive guidance to the behavior of persons they serve. 
This is not to say, of course, that the decline of the rehabilita-
tive ideal is wholly the product of a general social malaise. A 
rational and powerful critique of modern manifestations of reha-
bilitationism has been building for over a generation. Perhaps the 
most -important focus of this attack is on the political implica-
tions of the rehabilitative ideal. Therapists have been slow to 
recognize that a regime of rehabilitation is, in fact, a system of 
governance over persons in positions of dependency, and as such 
raises basic questions of individual immunities and political val-
ues. The same point may be made, of course, about any penologi-
cal program, whether or not motivated by rehabilitative aspira-
tions. Nevertheless, the political problem is immeasurably inten-
sified by the rehabilitative ideal, for it contemplates a regime 
necessarily involving large exercises of official discretion and offi-
cial concerns extending well beyond the external compliance of 
inmates with institutional regulations, into the thoughts and 
motivations of the subject population. 
It may be doubted, however, that the disaffection into which 
the rehabilitative ideal fell in the 1970s is primarily the result of 
the rational case arrayed against it. Part of that case is that 
rehabilitative techniques employed in American penology simply 
do not work, that there is no evidence that we possess the knowl-
edge and techniques to prevent criminal recidivism. Whether or 
not the proposition in this stark form is valid, one thing is clear: 
it is not new. Highly skeptical and sometimes carefully consid-
ered appraisals of rehabilitative capacity extend far back to the 
period before World War II. Arguments asserting the ineffective-
ness of rehabilitative efforts were brushed aside for a generation. 
- In the 1970s they became persuasive. 
We have, accordingly, entered into an era in which concern 
is being expressed most strongly for the value of just punishment 
and for deterrence achieved by punishment, as contrasted with 
rehabilitative treatment. Modern attention to the justice of pun-
ishment is surely appropriate and, no doubt, overdue. Yet in the 
law, as in other kinds of social action, any posture taken toward 
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complex issues is attended by its own distinctive pathologies and 
its own set of unexpected consequences. There is truth in Eric 
Sevareid's observation that a "chfef cause of problems is solu-
tions."5 One of the objectives of modern reform, reflecting its 
strong egalitarian tendency, is the reduction of sentencing dis-
parities-disparities resulting from the awarding of widely dif-
ferent penalties to persons who have committed substantially 
identical criminal acts. This, certainly, is an important and 
proper objective. Yet as Aristotle perceived, injustice may arise 
not only when persons who have committed the same crime are 
treated differently, but also when persons who have committed 
different crimes are treated the same. It is this second kind of in-
justice to which contemporary attitudes tend. No criminal code, 
however skillfully constructed, can encompass all the myriad 
differences of circumstance that are relevant to the justice of 
penalties. These can only be taken into account, and then im-
perfectly, through the exercise of wise sentencing discretion. Yet 
intolerance of such discretion is one of the leading characteristics 
of modern reform. Ths intolerance produces a further irony. The 
stripping of discretion from judges and correctional officials does 
not eliminate it from the system. Rather, it relocates discretion 
in other parts of the criminal process. Denying discretion to 
judges enhances discretion in prosecutors and the police. 
There are other sources of disquiet. Criminal justice tends to 
harshness and excess. Constant effort is demanded to prevent the 
process from falling below minimal standards of decency and 
humanity; and even constant effort often proves inadequate for 
the task. Despite the failings of the rehabilitative ideal (and in 
many respects they have been monumental) one clear contribu-
tion may be listed to its credit. Persons with strong rehabilitative 
motives have been the chief source of pressure for amelioration 
of the physical and moral environments of penal institutions. One 
may well inquire where the impetus for decency and humanity 
will come from in an era marked by the eclipse of the rehabilita-
tive ideal. This observation suggests broader concerns. We have 
traditionally viewed mercy and justice as contrasting values. Per-
haps we have erred in this. The history of prisons indicates that 
elementary decency fails when compassion is lost. Perhaps we 
may be led to the conclusion, both in the criminal law and in 
wider areas of social concern, that justice in our times cannot be 
5. Quoted in C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169 (1978). 
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approached without compassion. 
It has been suggested in these comments that the law pro-
vides an interesting and useful vantage point from which to view 
the late twentieth-century world. Professionals are not prone to 
underrate the importance of their disciplines, and appropriate 
modesty requires an exertion of will. To note the kinship of legal 
issues with those of the larger society is not to assert their iden-
tity. Context is important. What is most characteristic of modern 
society is not its organic unity but its fragmentation. Different 
values and assumptions dominate in the economic, the social, 
and the esthetic arenas; and these diversities and contradictions 
go far to define the modern condition. One of the strengths of the 
law as a source of general understanding is that in considerable 
degree it is involved in all these areas. Yet, as Justice Holmes 
suggested, the law is a small subject; and its contributions to 
understanding are limited. The law is not a mirror of society. 
Certainly it provides no compass to direct the course or establish 
the destination. The modest assertion is this: The law may con-
tribute to a feel for the climate of our times, for the lay of the 
land. 
